Mali: Evolving mess in the Sahel

Aliyu Musa

Mali, once an enviable stabilizing democracy since a return to civil rule in 1992, wafted into a major political instability with the coup d’état that sacked President Amadou Toumani Toure and brought Captain Amadou Sanogo to power in March last year. Before the coup there had been a longstanding disquiet in the north of the country where the Tuareg rebels’ secessionist bid had been suppressed. But the coup and the disoriented state of the Malian military created a huge vacuum, which the rebels under the aegis of the National Movement Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) swiftly took advantage of to inflict serious casualties on the fleeing national army and declare the independence of the Azawad state.

Although the rebels had expected their unmitigated routing of Mali’s forces to translate to total liberation and recognition from the international community, the reverse has, however, been the case. In any case, in addition to the refusal to recognize the Azawad independence from Mali, international mediators have insisted on a return to the previous order before further talks could be had.

But far more complex than this have been the attempts by volatile insurgents to tear into shreds the historic country that for centuries was the nucleus of Islamic culture and learning; home to the legendary Sundiata Keita whose descendant Salif Keita’s contribution to afro-pop music is unparalleled, Mansa Kankan Musa and the unforgettable multitalented Ali Ibrahim Farka Toure amongst many others.

Mali’s steady evolution to a failed state is facilitated by three main factors: the failure of the state to assert its authority, protect its citizens and ensure justice to all, including the Tuaregs complaining of marginalization; acute poverty and food crisis; and the emergence of local and international agent provocateurs and violent extremist groups. For example the Harakat Ansar al-Dine, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (Mujao) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are competing for space and authority using religion as a decoy.

On the surface the three major insurgents claim their common objective is to ensure the strict observance of Islamic law. But in reality they have individually and collectively done more to flout Islamic rules in various ways. In the areas they are in control in northern Mali (although Malian soldiers are also indicted) Human Rights groups including the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay have complained of unprecedented abuse of Human Rights. Rape, torture and outright killings have been reported and many people have been forced to flee their homes.

Even amongst the insurgents cases of wrangling were reported at some point, leading to the emergence of breakaway factions. Mujao, for instance, is an AQIM splinter group that is linked to violence against Tuareg separatists. And both the Ansar al-Dine and MNLA are made of mercenaries that fought on the side of the fallen regime of the late Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, but are now back home and in possession of sophisticated weapons with which they trigger terror. Kidnapping for ransom and cocaine, marijuana and cigarettes vending are believed to be their main sources of funding.

Apart from the harm rebel activities cause, the distress call interim President Dioncounda Traore sent to the powerful nations of the world to help check the rebel incursion, which France has already responded to, could have serious implications. The immediate is the likelihood of heavy civilian casualties and further the devastation of the country. Other consequences might comprise turning Mali into another Afghanistan or Iraq or even Libya, where the ordinary people, especially, would know no peace; they would end up being tormented and killed by rebels while bombardments of rebel hideouts result in ‘unintended’ but highly likely civilian casualties.

What Mali desperately needed and still needs is for its own military to be bolstered to fight the rebels themselves. They already have the terrain familiarity advantage over and above foreign forces. This option was initially considered but never given the earnestness it badly deserved. It also needs the poverty and food crises that are obviously providing incentives to youth who swell the ranks of rebels addressed. As a way forward the international community could, as a matter of urgency, consider giving the country food aid and grants to support poverty alleviation policies, which should be monitored to ensure those who really need help get it.

Postscript:

This article has been published in the Blueprint newspaper of 18/01/13.